The full text of the proposed Rulebook for the Space Debris Exposure Rating and the Space Debris Credit. Click any underlined term for a plain explanation, and use the explainers to see how each rule works.
Not in force. No one has adopted these rules, and no rating or credit has been issued under them. They are open for consultation.
intact objects in low Earth orbit with known mass, in the open GCAT catalogue.
46%
of the derelicts' debris risk sits in just 50 objects, most of them abandoned rocket stages.
80×
more risk removed by taking down the ten worst derelicts than ten picked at random.
So clean-up pays off when it targets the right objects, but nobody is paid to do it, and leaving a dead stage in orbit is rarely illegal. The Rulebook proposes how to measure risk, how to reward verified reductions without paying for what the law already requires, how to keep the record honest, and how to share the money with countries that are new to space. Figures from working paper WP-04; explore them in the lab.
Part A sets the terms and the law. Part G says how rules change, Part I how the scheme is adopted, Part J how it is judged.
Before you start
How to read this draft
Each rule is presented in three parts:
Rule: the proposed text.
Why: the rationale and its source.
Open: choices this draft deliberately leaves to consultation.
Rules marked ⚙︎ are implemented in the reference code. The code's tests act as executable checks of the rule. "Option" in a rule's title means the rule applies only if a jurisdiction or the scheme chooses that instrument.
The draft has ten Parts:
Part
Covers
A
Purpose, definitions, roles, and the scheme's place in space law
B
The (SDER)
C
The (SDC): unit, eligibility, lifecycle
D
Verification, audit, compliance review and disputes
E
and public reporting
F
Policy instruments that may use SDER and SDC
G
Governance and rule changes
H
The (ESAF)
I
Phased implementation, national integration and international pathways
J
Outcome indicators and review
Relationship to the 2025 drafts. This draft replaces internal drafts written in 2025, which were never published (see ORIGIN.md). Their policy content is carried over here: the definitions, the legal framework, the rating, verification and audit, governance, the Equitable Space Access Fund, and phased adoption. Their technical premises are not: a blockchain token, non-fungible disposal certificates, oracles that stake collateral, smart-contract enforcement, a decentralised governance body, and market-size projections. Where a 2025 parameter is kept as a starting point for consultation (for example the ESAF funding shares), it is labelled as such under Open.
This Rulebook defines how a mission's debris exposure may be described () and how a verified reduction in long-lived debris risk may be recorded as a (). Its purpose is to make the cost of leaving long-lived risk in orbit visible, and to give States, insurers and other buyers a common unit for paying for its reduction. It covers objects in Earth orbit and the operators, servicers and launching States associated with them. The activities in scope are launches, operations, end-of-life disposal, and .
Why
Kadri & Shishkina (2026, §1): a framework that does not link action to measurable outcome will not change behaviour.
Open for consultation
Whether lunar and cislunar orbits should later be covered by an annex.
Object: a catalogued space object identified by its COSPAR or NORAD identifier.
Legacy object: an object launched before the scheme's start date, or whose original operator no longer exists or no longer controls it.
Risk proxy Ri:Mi × Li × Pci, where M is mass, L is over the H and Pc is over H (paper §6). It is a proxy, not a probability of catastrophe.
Horizon H: the period over which persistence and collision probability are assessed. The research default is 25 years.
Action: an operation that changes one or more terms of R for one or more objects.
ΔR: the expected risk reduction of an action, Σi (Ri,before - Ri,after).
Reference unit : the reduction represented by one .
Claims and evidence
Baseline: what would likely have happened without the action, including every applicable legal requirement.
Claim: a request to record an outcome as an SDC, with its unit definition, and evidence.
Evidence class: one of verified, independently_observed, modeled or operator_statement.
Retirement: the one-way use of an SDC unit to support an or a public , after which it cannot be used again.
Ratings and obligations
SDER assessment: a mission-level description of debris exposure under a published (Part B).
Obligation: a requirement, set by a licensing authority or accepted voluntarily, to disclose an or to retire SDC units (Part F).
Quota: an obligation expressed as a number of units to retire per period or per object launched (F3, an option).
Bonus–malus adjustment: a change to an obligation according to an SDER (F4, an option).
Institutions and people
Equitable Space Access Fund (ESAF): the fund in Part H, which supports participation by and shared infrastructure.
Emerging space actor: a State without an established national space agency or launch capability, or an organisation in such a State, or a first-time operator (H6 defines eligibility).
Verifier: an accredited entity, independent of the claimant, that confirms outcomes (Part D).
Data provider: a source of tracking, catalogue or telemetry data used as evidence, for example a national surveillance network or a commercial tracking provider.
Try it
What makes an object dangerous
Move the object up or make it heavier. Watch which term changes: drag clears low orbits within years, while crowding and mass set the rest.
Nothing in this Rulebook overrides the jurisdiction and control of the , the liability regime, or national licensing law. The publishes rules, verifies outcomes and keeps the record. It holds no enforcement power.
The scheme is designed to sit inside existing law. Each instrument below shapes one or more rules.
Instrument
What it requires
How this Rulebook relates
(1967), Art. VI
States bear international responsibility for national activities and must authorise and continually supervise non-governmental ones
Licensing authorities are the natural place to attach (F1, I2). disclosure and records can document supervision
OST Art. VII; (1972), Arts. II, III, V
Absolute liability for damage on Earth; fault-based liability in space; joint and several liability for joint launches
Claims involving proximity operations must allocate liability first (C6). Registry records may serve as evidence of due care, but the scheme does not change the liability regime
OST Art. VIII
The keeps jurisdiction and control; ownership is unaffected by being in space
Removal of another State's object needs that State's consent (C6). No abandonment or salvage is assumed
OST Art. IX
Due regard for the interests of other States; consultation before potentially harmful interference
Gives a treaty basis for treating long-lived objects in congested shells as a shared concern
(1975), Arts. II, IV
National registries and basic orbital data furnished to the UN
Identity layer for (C8). Registries may note disposal plans and recorded outcomes (E1)
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, Rev. 4 (2025); Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (2007)
Limit released debris, prevent break-ups, dispose after mission, avoid collisions
Define the practices a reflects (C3) and the factors SDER assesses (B2)
COPUOS (2019)
21 voluntary guidelines, including information sharing and conjunction assessment
Support the data-sharing and transparency rules (D2, E3)
ISO 24113:2023
Auditable debris mitigation requirements
Reference for evidence requirements (C2, D1)
Second Report and Order 22-74 (2022)
Five-year post-mission disposal for space stations licensed in, or seeking access to, the US; effective 9 September 2024
Sets the baseline for systems it covers (C3)
France, Space Operations Act (2008)
Authorisation and technical regulations including end-of-life obligations
A national baseline (C3)
Proposed , COM(2025) 335
Debris mitigation plans at authorisation, collision-avoidance capability for constellations, an EU legal representative for non-EU operators; full application proposed from 1 January 2030. Still in the legislative procedure
A future baseline. The proposal contains no removal obligation and no tradable credits; the scheme would complement it, not implement it
Why
WP-01 §2–4, which documents each provision against the primary texts [ost1967; liab1972; reg1975; iadc2025; copuos2007sdmg; lts2019; iso24113; fcc2022; eu2025spaceact].
Open for consultation
Whether the scheme should seek recognition under the LTS Guidelines' reporting practice.
Try it
Where the Rulebook sits in space law
Pick an instrument to see what it requires and which rule responds to it.
Binding treaties
Voluntary guidelines and standards
National and regional rules
OST Art. VIII
RequiresThe State of registry keeps jurisdiction and control, and ownership is never lost.
In the RulebookNo removal of another State's object without its consent (C6).
Participation is voluntary unless a licensing authority makes it a condition. Only States and their authorities may impose sanctions, such as fines, licence conditions, suspension or refusal of a licence. The may refuse to record a , a recorded unit (C10), suspend a 's accreditation (D1), and publish these decisions. It reports suspected non-compliance to the relevant licensing authority.
Why
Paper §16.6; WP-01 §6, requirement 5. A private administrator that claimed enforcement powers would lack legitimacy and legal basis.
Open for consultation
Whether participants should accept, by contract, a binding first-instance dispute procedure (D4).
An describes a mission's exposure across its lifecycle under a published . It is not a ranking of operators. No league tables are published until coverage, peer review, correction and appeal processes are working.
Whether to include inclination, area-to-mass ratio and mission duration, which are listed in the paper's Table 2 but not yet implemented.
Whether to include design features: low-fragmentation design, avoiding release of mission-related objects, passive deorbit devices such as drag sails, design-for-demise, and aids that make later capture or tracking easier.
Whether to include compliance with standards (, ISO 24113, national rules) as a separate factor, or only through the .
Whether to include the operator's track record: disposal success rate, past break-ups, collision-avoidance practice. This stays excluded until correction and appeal processes exist (WP-02 §5), because an error in a track record harms an operator across every future assessment.
Every input carries an and a source reference. A component takes the class of its weakest input, and a weaker class widens the component's uncertainty interval.
A missing input is never replaced by a favourable value. It is scored at its worst case and named in the output. The result is when nothing is missing and provisional when the missing weight is at or below a published threshold. Above that threshold the result is withheld.
Why
4.
Open for consultation
The threshold. It is 0.30 in research methods v0.1 and v0.2.
Every result gives a point estimate and an interval. A (low, medium or high) is reported together with whether the interval lies entirely inside it.
Why
3. A single score must not look more certain than its inputs.
Try it
Missing data never helps
Untick what the operator has not shown. Each missing input is scored at its worst case and widens the range. Past the threshold, no rating is published.
Weights, tables and thresholds are published as a . Each assessment records the method's identifier and its SHA-256. A new version never changes the meaning of a past assessment.
Why
7; paper §16.1.
Open for consultation
The 2025 drafts proposed illustrative weights of 40% orbit, 20% design, 15% track record, 15% local density and 10% standards compliance. Research method v0.2 uses different, calibrated tables; see WP-02 and WP-04. Which weighting a pilot adopts is for the .
An assessed operator receives the inputs, the and the rationale for each component. The operator may submit corrected evidence, and may appeal to a panel that took no part in the assessment.
If a scheme reports an operator-level figure, it is computed from the operator's mission assessments under one , with the number of missions and the share shown next to it. It is published only once B1's conditions are met.
Why
The 2025 drafts rated operators rather than missions. Mission-level assessment is more accurate and easier to correct, but insurers and regulators often reason about operators.
Open for consultation
Whether operator-level figures should exist at all, given the risk that they become league tables.
An may be used for disclosure, to adjust an (F4), to inform an orbital-use fee (F1), or as an insurance or procurement criterion (F1). Each use names the and the (B5). A result cannot be used to reduce an obligation.
One represents a verified reduction of in the over a stated , relative to a stated . The number of units for an action is calculated from the of , meaning the lowest reduction consistent with the evidence, rounded down.
Why
SDC 1; paper §6. Uncertainty may only reduce what is issued.
Open for consultation
How ΔR0 is set: fixed by the , or a percentile of observed ΔR over a calibration period (paper §6). Also, the horizon H for each regime.
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Why uncertainty can only reduce what is issued
Removing the Zenit-2 stage ranked first in WP-04 lowers R by about 160, but the evidence only guarantees about 11. Units are counted from that low end.
Only the following classes are eligible during a pilot:
Class
Baseline
Minimum evidence
early_deorbit: post-mission disposal beyond the applicable rule
the applicable national rule, otherwise the guideline
independent orbit history; operator maneuver logs; tracking confirmation of decay or disposal orbit
controlled_reentry
uncontrolled decay
reentry prediction and maneuver telemetry; independent confirmation of decay and disappearance; reentry notice where applicable
passivation at end of life
no
operator passivation report; telemetry of tank pressures and battery states; audit sampling; monitoring for absence of break-up
active_removal of an intact derelict
object remains in its shell
independent tracking before and after; rendezvous evidence; change in the catalogue; audit of identity linkage; consent (C6)
servicing_enabled_disposal
object remains persistent
servicer telemetry and tracking; capability evidence before and after; disposal confirmation
Why
Paper §4 and Table 1. Each class must change a risk-relevant state variable and be verifiable from independent data.
Open for consultation
Collision-avoidance maneuvers are excluded. They are routine practice, and the counterfactual cannot be verified. Natural decay of a derelict is also excluded, because no one acted.
are versioned by jurisdiction and by date. Doing what the law requires earns no units. Only performance is credited.
Why
2; WP-01 §4. For example, the disposal rule makes a 25-year baseline too lenient for systems it covers.
Try it
Only what goes beyond the law earns credit
A satellite left alone would stay up about 40 years. The operator brings it down early. How much of that is creditable depends on what the law already requires.
Licensed under
legal limit 25 y
in orbit creditable: 23 years already required: 15 years
Disposing after 2 years beats the 25-year rule by 23 years. Only those years count.
Disposal credits apply only to performance . Legacy-removal credits are restricted to objects launched before the scheme, or to removals by an entity other than the original operator acting under explicit consent. Newly launched objects become eligible for disposal credits only after a waiting period.
Why
Paper §8: "Paying for cleaning your own room can create if it rewards the creation of risk."
A lists references to its evidence. Evidence covered by confidentiality may be held by the , but the publishes a commitment to it (a hash) and the verifier's finding.
An action on an object outside the claimant's domestic jurisdiction is eligible only with documented consent from the . Before recognition, the claimant shows how liability is allocated between servicer, State of registry and licensing State.
WP-03 §2. A correction must remain possible even after .
Open for consultation
Whether a reversible suspended state is needed while a dispute is open (D4). The 2025 drafts froze disputed credits; the reference code has no such state yet.
Try it
A claim's life, as the registry enforces it
Click a state to try moving the claim there. The registry refuses illegal moves, as the reference code does.
A servicer has claimed the removal of a derelict stage. Try to move the claim.
Only one non-void may exist for a given (object identifier, outcome type). Within one action, an object may appear only once. Credits go to a single accountable entity, typically the operator under the authorising State. A service provider may receive the economic value by contract, but the still records only one issuance for the physical event.
Why
4; paper §7.
Open for consultation
How to prevent the same outcome being claimed in another scheme. Cross-registry identifiers are one route.
reject and revoke require a public reason. If a recorded outcome proves false, for example because an object reported as reentered is re-acquired by tracking, the is and the revocation is published. A claimant found to have made a knowingly false claim is barred from submitting claims for a published period, and the informs its licensing authority. A that confirmed it without due care loses accreditation (D1).
Why
4; GOVERNANCE.md. The 2025 drafts set the same consequences.
Open for consultation
Who bears the loss when a unit is revoked: the claimant must replace it, or the it supported is reopened.
An action is eligible only if the objects it concerns can be reliably before and after, by at least one independent of the claimant. The publishes the size threshold for each orbital regime and widens the scope as tracking improves (D6).
Why
Verification depends on independent tracking. Objects larger than about 10 cm are tracked routinely in [nasa_odpo_faq]; the threshold is higher in orbit.
Open for consultation
The thresholds. The 2025 drafts proposed about 10 cm in LEO and about 1 m in GEO. Whether removal of many small fragments, once trackable, should earn units in proportion to .
No unit is issued for an action that itself creates undue risk, such as deliberate fragmentation, or an action carried out in breach of flight-safety rules or without the coordination a licensing authority requires. If an action produces debris, that debris is counted against .
Why
The point of the unit is net risk reduction. Carried over from the 2025 drafts.
A claimant files a plan for any action it intends to , before the action, with its , and evidence plan. Actions not notified in advance may be claimed only if the evidence required by C2 is still complete, and they are marked as such.
Why
Advance filing makes the baseline harder to adjust after the event, and lets prepare independent observation. Carried over from the 2025 drafts, which encouraged advance plans.
Units are counted in , not per object or per kilogram removed.
Why
One unit per object would treat a 1 kg fragment like a 9 t rocket stage. One unit per kilogram ignores and congestion. WP-04 shows that, on real catalogue data, removing the ten highest-R derelicts reduces R by about 80 times as much as removing ten at random. A per-object unit would hide that difference.
Open for consultation
Whether a simpler per-object unit should be allowed in Phase 0 (I1) for administrative reasons, with a conversion published later.
are accredited against published criteria: technical competence, independence and data handling. A verifier must not be the claimant and must declare conflicts. The refuses a conflicted assignment. Only the assigned verifier may record verification. The publishes the list of accredited verifiers and , and may add, suspend or remove them.
Wherever possible, an outcome is confirmed by at least two independent data sources, for example two tracking networks, or tracking plus operator telemetry. If the sources disagree, or the confirmation threshold is not met, a third-party audit starts automatically and no unit is issued until it ends.
Informal resolution, facilitated by the : sharing data, correcting inputs, recalculating.
A dispute panel combining technical and legal expertise, under published procedures and timelines. Every party affected has the right to be heard, and decisions rest on the evidence and give reasons.
External recourse. Nothing in this Rulebook prevents a party from going to national courts or diplomatic channels. A court decision that bears on a recorded outcome is applied in the .
When disputes show that a rule is systematically ambiguous, the rule is clarified in the next method cycle.
Why
Paper §16.2. The for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities (2011) are a ready template for tier 2 [pca2011].
Open for consultation
Whether tier 2 should be binding by contract on participants.
Where an exists (Part F), the compares each participant's retirements with its obligation once per period and publishes the result. A shortfall is handled in steps: notice, then a published grace period, then a report to the licensing authority, which decides any sanction (A6).
Why
The 2025 drafts proposed the same graduated response. It keeps enforcement with States.
The records every event: submission, assignment, verification, rejection, issuance, and . Each record carries a sequence number, a timestamp, the actor and the payload.
Why
Paper §7.
Open for consultation
Whether national registries under the should cross-reference recorded outcomes.
The is an in which each entry carries the hash of the previous one. When the log is opened, it is replayed and re-checked against these rules. The head hash is published on a schedule in at least one location the does not control.
Why
WP-03 §4. A hash chain gives the tamper evidence the 2025 drafts sought from a blockchain, without a token or a consensus network. Anchoring the head hash is not yet implemented.
Try it
Rewrite history and watch the chain break
These five entries were written by the Python reference registry for a demo removal of the Zenit-2 stage. Your browser recomputes every fingerprint now.
The publishes aggregate outcomes, including total . It also publishes methods, anonymised verification statistics (time, cost, dispute rate) and uncertainty ranges for key parameters. Sensitive operational details are not published.
Each year the publishes an orbital sustainability report covering: recorded and by action class and regime; rejected and , with reasons; audit findings (D5); compliance review results (D7); accounts and grants (H7); and progress on the indicators in Part J.
Why
The 2025 drafts proposed an annual report of this kind. One document makes the scheme checkable by people outside it.
This Rulebook does not presuppose a market. Recorded outcomes may serve any of the following:
Instrument
How a recorded SDC or SDER is used
Main risk
Voluntary
Operators or purchasers retire units to support of stewardship
Weak demand; greenwashing if claims are loose
Licensing
Authorities require exposure disclosure and retirement in proportion to the rating in defined shells
Needs a legal basis in each jurisdiction
Deposit or bond
A bond is refunded on verified disposal, and a forfeited bond funds remediation
Calibration; are not covered
Orbital-use fee
The rating informs a fee on congestion (Rao et al. 2020)
Harmonisation; operators move to permissive jurisdictions
Procurement or insurance criterion
Buyers and insurers reward low exposure and retired units
Uneven coverage
Public procurement of removal
An agency pays for removal of chosen objects and records the outcome
Finite budgets; no lasting price signal
Why
Vision & Principles 5; paper §12.
Open for consultation
Whether units may ever be transferred. If they may, transfer rules, holder disclosure and measures against manipulation are needed before any transfer is allowed.
Try it
One unit, many possible uses
The Rulebook does not assume a market. Filter the instruments a recorded outcome could serve.
Show
Voluntary retirement
Operators or buyers retire units to back stewardship claims.
Risk: Weak demand; greenwashing if claims are loose.
Licensing obligation
Authorities require disclosure and retirement in proportion to the rating.
Risk: Needs a legal basis in each jurisdiction.
Deposit or bond
Refunded on verified disposal; forfeits fund remediation.
Risk: Calibration; does not cover legacy objects.
Orbital-use fee
The rating informs a congestion fee.
Risk: Operators may move to permissive jurisdictions.
Insurance or procurement criterion
Insurers and buyers reward low exposure and retired units.
Risk: Uneven coverage.
Public procurement of removal
An agency pays for chosen removals and records them.
Risk: Finite budgets; no lasting price signal.
Tradable units
Units change hands before retirement. Not assumed by the Rulebook (F1, Open).
Risk: Needs transfer rules, holder disclosure and anti-manipulation measures first.
A jurisdiction that sets an publishes: who is covered; the unit per object launched or per unit of exposure; the period; how initial allocations, if any, are made; and an aggregate ceiling. The ceiling is set so that, across covered operators, long-lived risk does not grow. A stricter ambition, in which each new object is matched by a recorded reduction (""), is one possible end point.
Why
The 2025 drafts proposed a global cap. A cap can only be set by authorities with jurisdiction, so this draft frames it as a published design for each jurisdiction.
Open for consultation
How allocations are made (free, by auction, or by a mix), and how is brought into obligations over time (I1).
An may be adjusted by . Missions in the low band with an interval wholly inside it may have their obligation reduced. Missions in the high band may have it increased, for example to two units where one would otherwise apply. Missions in the middle band, or whose interval crosses a band boundary, keep the nominal obligation. The adjustment schedule is published with the .
Why
The 2025 drafts proposed for the best tier and extra obligations for the worst. Tying the adjustment to band certainty (B5) stops an uncertain rating from earning a reduction.
Open for consultation
Whether a reduction should take the form of fewer units owed or of units granted from a reserve. Granting units creates supply without a physical outcome, so this draft prefers fewer units owed.
Where a licensing authority imposes a financial penalty for a shortfall, it is invited to direct a published share of it to the (H2). The itself imposes no financial penalties (A6).
Why
Carried over from the 2025 drafts, which sent penalties to the fund.
at least 30 days of comment for substantive changes;
a published decision with reasons;
versioned effect, so a change never applies retroactively.
The cadence is annual, with an emergency route for safety-critical corrections. Every emergency change is logged with its reason and reviewed at the next annual cycle.
Why
Paper §16.1, where rule drift is named as a central failure mode.
An independent expert group is drawn from operators, insurers, regulators and independent researchers, with conflicts declared. It proposes method updates. Voting rules prevent any one class of participant from dominating.
Why
Paper §16.1; Vision & Principles, "Governance proposed for the Institute".
The and any affiliated organisation may implement the method. They may not assess or certify their own missions or , chair the permanently, hold a seat on the , or veto a method.
Why
Vision & Principles 6; DISCLOSURES.md. The 2025 drafts gave the originating company veto rights over technical parameters and a seat on the fund's board. This draft removes both.
The reports annually to the States that recognise the scheme, and offers its reports to through a participating State or observer organisation.
Why
The 2025 drafts placed the scheme under the auspices of UNOOSA and COPUOS. Neither body can be committed by this Rulebook, so the rule describes what the administrator itself can do.
Open for consultation
Whether a dedicated intergovernmental body should take over the administrator's functions if the scheme reaches Phase 3 (I1).
Governance widens as participation grows. When published milestones are met, seats in the and decision rights pass from founding participants to broader constituencies. The milestones concern the number of participating States and operators, the share of participants that are , and years of operation.
Why
The 2025 drafts set similar milestones for handing control from a founding consortium to the wider community.
Open for consultation
The milestones; whether decisions on method changes need agreement of two chambers (one for States, one for operators and other participants); whether some decisions should be one entity, one vote.
The following can be changed only by a supermajority set out in GOVERNANCE.md, after at least 90 days of comment: A4 (relationship to law), C3 (), C6 (consent), G3 (), and the existence of the and its beneficiary floor (H2, H6).
Why
The 2025 drafts proposed "constitutional" protection for compliance and the fund's share, so that a narrow future majority could not remove them.
The exists so that debris rules do not become a barrier to entry for States and organisations with fewer resources, and so that they can take part in tracking, verification and remediation. It follows three principles:
Outer space is "the province of all mankind" and is free for exploration and use by all States ( Art. I).
Responsibility is proportional: those who place more long-lived risk in orbit contribute more.
Compliance should build capacity, not only cost money.
Why
[ost1967] Art. I; paper §11 ("Equity is not peripheral") and §16.4.
The receives a published share of each revenue stream the scheme or a recognising jurisdiction creates:
proceeds of any initial allocation or auction of (F3);
verification and fees;
penalties directed to it (F5) and forfeited bonds (F1);
fees on transfers, if transfer is ever permitted (F1).
It may also receive voluntary contributions from States, operators and foundations, and co-financing from development banks. No contribution buys influence over grant decisions.
Why
Paper §4, §8 and §16.4 propose that a share of auction revenue or fees supports shared infrastructure. A levy has precedent: the Adaptation Fund was first financed by 2% of the credits issued under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism, and the Paris Agreement's Article 6.4 mechanism sends 5% of issued units to it [unfccc_af].
Open for consultation
The shares. The 2025 drafts proposed 40% of initial allocation proceeds and 10% of ongoing fees and penalties. This draft keeps those figures as the starting point for consultation.
Try it
Follow the money into the Equitable Space Access Fund
Illustrative units, not forecasts. The sliders start at the 2025 proposal, which is only a starting point for consultation (H2).
Fund receives 58 of 190 units raised. The 50% beneficiary floor is met (H6).
An governs the fund, separately from issuance decisions. It has equal numbers of seats for:
(A2), with regional balance;
contributors.
It also has non-voting seats for independent experts, for example from UN development or space bodies. The chair rotates between the two groups each year. Decisions are by consensus where possible; otherwise by a two-thirds majority that includes a majority of each group. The holds no seat (G3).
Why
Paper §16.4: governance of the fund "should be separated from credit issuance decisions to avoid conflicts". The structure follows two working precedents. The Executive Committee of the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund has seven members from developing and seven from developed countries, rotates its chair, and decides by a two-thirds majority that includes a majority of each group [mlf_excom]. The Green Climate Fund's board has 24 members split equally between developing and developed countries [gcf_gi].
Open for consultation
The number of seats; how emerging-actor seats are filled; whether operators and States share the contributor seats.
The board publishes calls for proposals and its selection criteria. The criteria cover: the expected effect on orbital safety or on the applicant's ability to take part; the applicant's capacity to deliver; value for money; and regional balance. Every decision is published with reasons. Applicants may ask for a review once.
Why
Paper §16.4 asks for "published objectives … annual budgets, grant decisions, and impact metrics".
At least 50% of disbursements each year go to projects led by, or directly benefiting, .
Why
Carried over from the 2025 drafts. A floor keeps the fund from drifting towards the best-resourced applicants.
Open for consultation
The share; the exact definition of emerging space actor, for example by reference to UN country groupings or to the absence of national launch capability.
The publishes annual accounts, every grant with its amount and purpose, and an impact report against stated objectives. An independent audit of its finances is carried out each year (D5) and published.
The board holds an annual open forum, where possible alongside a session or the International Astronautical Congress. Funded projects report there and contributors announce pledges.
Why
Carried over from the 2025 drafts. A public forum keeps recipients' voices in the fund's decisions.
When a proposed rule change (G1) would raise , the board is consulted on its effect on and may propose transitional support. The board itself cannot change H2's shares or H6's floor; those follow G1 and G7.
Why
The 2025 drafts linked the fund's board to the main governance body for this reason.
The scheme is introduced in four phases. A phase begins only when the of the previous phase are met and published. The phases are not tied to dates.
Phase
What happens
Gates to move on
0. Pilot
A pilot publishes this Rulebook, accredits and runs the with public aggregate reporting. Eligible classes (C2) and (C3) are limited to actions with high verification confidence, such as and early disposal confirmed by independent tracking. One or two shells are chosen where and density justify the focus. One compliance cycle runs with a fixed date
Verification cost and time measured and published; dispute rate below a published level; at least one outcome of each pilot class verified; a documented consent pathway for objects outside domestic jurisdiction; method update cadence in place
1. Insurers and procurement
Insurers and customers reward low and retired units through pricing or contract preference. No legal yet. This tests whether demand appears without regulation
Measured change in operator behaviour, for example disposal success rate or the share of missions rated rather than provisional; at least one insurer or buyer using the scheme
2. National licensing
One or more licensing authorities require SDER disclosure, and retirement in proportion to the rating for missions in defined shells (I2), starting with a partial obligation. Early jurisdictions set up (I3). More States adopt compatible rules, including supported by the . Obligations may rise and may start to require a share of units from removal of
No unresolved between jurisdictions; indicators in Part J show slower growth of long-lived risk in target shells; ESAF disbursements meet the beneficiary floor
3. Harmonisation
Eligible actions, evidence requirements and reporting templates are aligned across jurisdictions and with existing guidance. Most launches are covered by compatible national rules or an international instrument (I4). The ambition becomes no net growth of long-lived risk, or a net reduction
Reviewed every five years against Part J (J2)
Why
Paper §10 sets out these four phases (pilot; insurers and procurement; national licensing; harmonisation) and §14 gives the pilot checklist. The 2025 drafts also had four phases, tied to years and to market-size forecasts. This draft ties them to evidence instead, because no forecast of that kind can yet be sourced.
Open for consultation
The thresholds for each gate. Whether Phases 1 and 2 can run in parallel in different jurisdictions.
Try it
The scheme grows only when the evidence says so
Tick the gates of a phase. The next phase opens only when all of them are met. No date moves it forward.
A pilot administrator publishes the Rulebook, accredits verifiers and runs the registry, for a few action classes with high verification confidence in one or two shells.
A State can integrate the scheme in several ways, which can be combined:
Launch and payload licensing: a licence condition that the operator disclose an and, where an exists, show of the required units before launch.
Operator licensing and continuing supervision: ongoing compliance (D7) as a condition of keeping an operator licence, as Art. VI allows.
Spectrum and market access: authorities that grant spectrum or market access may consider SDER disclosure. Any role for ITU procedures would need agreement among administrations and is speculative today.
Liability and insurance: a State may set financial-responsibility requirements according to SDER . Insurers may use ratings and retired units in underwriting.
Fiscal instruments: tax relief for removal services or for retirement, or a launch levy that is reduced when units are retired.
Why
WP-01 §4–5; paper §12. Carried over from the 2025 drafts.
Open for consultation
Which combination a first adopting jurisdiction should use.
Jurisdictions that implement this Rulebook recognise units issued under each other's implementation, provided both use the same unit definition (C1), publish their (C3) and share one or linked registries that enforce (C8). Each jurisdiction publishes a conformance statement.
Why
Paper §16.5 calls for interoperability through "a canonical definition of the credit unit and the rating method".
Recognition as a reference standard. States note the Rulebook in reporting, as they do for other standards.
A UN General Assembly resolution encouraging States to adopt measures consistent with it. Not binding, but politically significant.
An interpretive understanding or protocol on what due regard ( Art. IX) and continuing supervision (Art. VI) mean for long-lived objects, without reopening the Treaty.
A new agreement on orbital sustainability, with the unit and rating method in a technical annex.
Why
WP-01 §5 shows that much can be done without a new treaty. The 2025 drafts listed the same four pathways.
Open for consultation
Whether to pursue any pathway beyond 1 before Phase 2.
If removal capacity lags behind , authorities may phase obligations in more slowly, and the may co-fund removal missions. If recorded units greatly exceed obligations, authorities may tighten obligations sooner. If transfer is permitted, any price-stabilisation measure (for example a reserve) is published in advance with its trigger.
Why
Lessons from emissions trading, carried over from the 2025 drafts.
If the Part J indicators show that long-lived risk is falling and disposal is routine, the may propose moving the scheme to a maintenance mode with lighter reporting. This change follows G1.
Why
A scheme should not outlive its purpose. Carried over from the 2025 drafts.
Every five years, an independent review asks whether the scheme has reduced long-lived risk relative to what would likely have happened without it, and whether its costs fall fairly. The review is published with the data it used.
Why
Paper §14: if verification is not affordable or behaviour does not change, the evidence should show what to simplify or redesign.
Reference
Glossary
Active debris removal (ADR)
A spacecraft meets a dead object and takes it out of its orbit. Demonstrations are under way, such as JAXA's ADRAS-J inspection of a Japanese rocket stage in 2024.Rule C2
Additionality
The part of an outcome that would not have happened without the action. It is the test that stops credits being paid for business as usual, a known weakness of some carbon-credit schemes.Rule C3
Administrator
The body that keeps the rules and the registry, accredits verifiers and publishes reports. It records and verifies but cannot fine anyone. Enforcement stays with States.Rule G4
Band
Low, medium or high exposure, reported with whether the whole uncertainty interval falls inside the band. A score near a boundary could belong to either band. Saying so prevents false precision.Rule B5
Baseline
What would likely have happened without the action, including everything the law already requires. Paying people for what they must do anyway adds nothing. Only performance beyond the baseline earns units, which is called additionality.Rule C3
Bonus–malus
Lowering the obligation for low-exposure missions and raising it for high-exposure ones. It rewards good mission design. A reduction applies only if the whole uncertainty interval sits in the low band.Rule F4
Claim
A request to record an outcome as SDC units, with its baseline and evidence. Claims move through a fixed lifecycle, and each step is recorded so it can be checked or reversed.Rule C7
Collision probability (Pc)
The chance that an object is hit by another catalogued object over the horizon. It depends on how crowded the object's altitude is, how fast objects meet (around 10 km/s in low orbit) and how large the object is.Rule A2
Consent of the State of registry
The State that registered an object keeps jurisdiction and control over it, even when it is dead. Nobody may remove another State's object without that State's permission. There is no salvage law in space.Rule C6
Conservative bound
The lowest risk reduction consistent with the evidence. Units are counted from this low end and rounded down, so uncertainty can only reduce what is issued, never inflate it.Rule C1
Controlled reentry
Steering an object down so it burns up or falls into a remote ocean area at a planned time. It removes the object from orbit at once and keeps falling debris away from people.Rule C2
COPUOS
The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, where States discuss space law and guidelines. It is the natural forum to recognise a Rulebook like this one as a reference standard.Rule G5
Data provider
A source of tracking, catalogue or telemetry data, such as a national radar network or a commercial tracker. Outcomes are confirmed by at least two independent sources wherever possible.Rule D2
Double counting
Counting one physical outcome more than once, for example by two claimants or in two schemes. It would create units with nothing behind them. The registry allows one claim per object and outcome type.Rule C8
Emerging space actor
A State without an established space agency or launch capability, an organisation in such a State, or a first-time operator. At least half of the fund's money each year must go to them.Rule A2
Equitable Space Access Fund (ESAF)
A fund that receives a share of any money the scheme raises and supports countries and organisations with fewer resources. Debris rules could otherwise shut out new space nations. The fund pays for tracking access, training, deorbit devices and help with compliance costs.Rule H1
Evidence class
How strong a piece of evidence is, from verified data down to an operator's own statement. A rating built on weak evidence gets a wider uncertainty range, so it cannot look better than it is.Rule B3
Evidence gate
A measurable condition that must be met before the scheme moves to its next phase. The scheme grows only when it works, not because a calendar date has arrived.Rule I1
FCC five-year rule
A US rule requiring satellites in low orbit to be disposed of within five years of mission end, in force since September 2024. It shows why baselines differ by country. A 25-year baseline would over-credit a US-licensed satellite.Rule C3
Geostationary orbit (GEO)
The ring about 35,786 km above the equator where satellites match Earth's rotation. Objects there never decay naturally, and smaller ones are hard to track from the ground.Rule C11
Hash chain
A log in which each entry includes a cryptographic fingerprint of the previous entry. Changing any past entry breaks every fingerprint after it, so tampering is evident without a blockchain.Rule E2
Horizon (H)
The period over which persistence and collision probability are assessed; 25 years by default. A longer horizon gives more weight to objects that stay up for a long time. The choice changes rankings, so it is published.Rule A2
IADC guidelines
The debris mitigation guidelines of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, revised in 2025. They set the practices most national rules follow, such as disposing of satellites after their mission.Rule A5
Indicative, provisional, withheld
The three statuses of an SDER result, depending on how much input is missing. Missing inputs are scored at their worst case. If too much is missing, no rating is published at all.Rule B4
Legacy object
An object launched before the scheme started, or one whose operator no longer exists or controls it. Most of the risk sits in old rocket stages and dead satellites that nobody is paying to remove. They are the main target for removal credits.Rule A2
Liability Convention (1972)
The treaty on damage caused by space objects. Damage in orbit counts only if it is someone's fault, and leaving debris may not count as fault. That gap is why incentives are needed.Rule A5
Low Earth orbit (LEO)
Orbits up to 2,000 km altitude, where most satellites and most tracked debris are. It is the most crowded region, and the one where removing a few large objects matters most.Rule C11
LTS Guidelines
The UN's 21 voluntary guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities (2019). They encourage data sharing and conjunction assessment, which the Rulebook's transparency rules build on.Rule A5
Method version
A published file of weights, tables and thresholds, identified by a fingerprint (SHA-256). Anyone can recompute a rating, and a later change of method never silently changes an old result.Rule B6
Moral hazard
The risk that a reward for cleaning up encourages people to create the mess in the first place. If you could earn credits for deorbiting your own satellites, you might launch satellites just to deorbit them. Waiting periods and legacy-only rules prevent this.Rule C4
Mutual recognition
Jurisdictions accepting each other's units when they follow the same unit definition and a shared registry. Without it, operators would face a different credit system in every country.Rule I3
Obligation
A requirement to disclose a rating or to retire units, set by a licensing authority or accepted voluntarily. Without some obligation or buyer, nobody would need units. The Rulebook leaves the choice of instrument to each jurisdiction.Rule F1
One-up, one-down
An ambition in which every new object is matched by a recorded reduction elsewhere. It would stop the long-lived population from growing. The Rulebook treats it as one possible end point, not a premise.Rule F3
Originator
The person who first proposed the SDC and SDER ideas, and any organisation linked to them. The originator cannot rate their own missions, chair the review group permanently, sit on the ESAF board or veto a method.Rule G3
Outer Space Treaty (1967)
The founding treaty of space law, ratified by over 110 States. Article VI makes States responsible for their companies in space, VII makes them liable for damage, VIII keeps their ownership of objects, and IX requires due regard for others.Rule A5
Passivation
Emptying fuel tanks and discharging batteries at end of life so the object cannot explode. Explosions of old stages and satellites have created a large share of today's fragments.Rule C2
PCA Optional Rules
The Permanent Court of Arbitration's 2011 rules for disputes about outer space activities. They give a ready-made procedure for the Rulebook's dispute panel.Rule D4
Persistence (L)
The share of the horizon an object is expected to stay in orbit before atmospheric drag brings it down. Below about 500 km, drag clears objects within years. Higher up, they can stay for centuries, so the same object is far more dangerous there.Rule A2
Proposed EU Space Act
A European Commission proposal of June 2025 for safety, resilience and sustainability rules, proposed to apply from 2030. It would require debris mitigation plans, including from non-EU operators serving the EU. It contains no credits and no removal obligation.Rule A5
Quota
An obligation expressed as units to retire per period or per object launched. A ceiling on total long-lived risk is one way to stop it growing. Only authorities with jurisdiction can set one.Rule F3
Reference unit ΔR₀
The amount of ΔR that one SDC unit represents. Fixing it makes units comparable. How to set it is one of the main open questions in the consultation.Rule C1
Registration Convention (1975)
The treaty requiring States to register the objects they launch with the UN. Registration gives each object an identity, which a credit needs so that it can be tied to one object only.Rule A5
Registry
The public record of every claim, verification, issuance, retirement and revocation. Each entry carries the fingerprint of the one before, so any later edit to history is visible.Rule E1
Retirement
The one-way use of a unit for an obligation or a public claim. Once retired, a unit cannot be used again. This is what stops the same clean-up being counted twice.Rule C9
Review group
Independent experts from operators, insurers, regulators and research who challenge the method. Its voting rules stop any one kind of participant from controlling how risk is measured.Rule G2
Revocation
Cancelling a recorded unit because the outcome proved false, with a published reason. If an object reported as reentered is spotted again by radar, its units are revoked, even after retirement.Rule C10
Risk proxy R = M × L × Pc
Mass times persistence times collision probability, a simple measure of how much debris an object could create. Heavy objects that stay up for decades in crowded orbits can break into thousands of fragments if hit. The product of the three terms ranks them. It is a proxy, not the probability of a disaster.Rule A2
Share of proceeds
A fixed percentage of units or revenue set aside for a public purpose. Climate finance already works this way. The Adaptation Fund received 2% of credits issued under the Clean Development Mechanism.Rule H2
Space Debris Credit (SDC)
A unit that records a verified reduction in long-lived debris risk, measured against a baseline. It gives a common way to count, and pay for, actions that make orbit safer, such as removing a dead rocket stage. A unit only exists after independent verification, and none has been issued yet.Rule C1
Space Debris Exposure Rating (SDER)
A mission-level description of how much long-lived debris risk a mission creates, with its uncertainty. Today it is hard to compare missions. A published rating with honest uncertainty lets regulators, insurers and buyers see which missions plan their disposal well.Rule B1
Trackability
Whether an object can be followed reliably by surveillance networks. Objects above about 10 cm are tracked routinely in low orbit. Smaller ones cannot be verified yet, so actions on them do not earn units.Rule C11
Verifier
An accredited body, independent of the claimant, that checks the evidence for an outcome. Verifiers are paid by participants, so they are rotated, sampled and re-audited to keep them honest.Rule D1
ΔR (risk reduction)
How much an action lowers the risk proxy, summed over the objects it affects. It is what a credit measures. Removing a 9-tonne stage from a crowded orbit can be worth hundreds of times more ΔR than removing a small satellite that would soon fall anyway.Rule A2
Active debris removal: rendezvous with a defunct object and removal from its orbit
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
COSPAR ID
International designator of a launched object
Equitable Space Access Fund (Part H)
Geostationary orbit, about 35,786 km altitude
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
Low Earth orbit, up to 2,000 km altitude
COPUOS Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (2019)
NORAD ID
Satellite catalogue number assigned by the US Space Force
Outer Space Treaty (1967)
Permanent Court of Arbitration
Space Debris Credit (Part C)
Space Debris Exposure Rating (Part B)
UNOOSA
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs
Respond
Consultation questions
Is R = M × L × Pc a sufficient proxy for a pilot, or should the consequence term be replaced at once by a fragment-based metric such as ECOB?
How should be set so that units stay comparable across regimes?
Which evidence can be public without compromising operator confidentiality or security?
What waiting period (C4) prevents missions from being designed to earn credits?
Should transfer of units ever be permitted (F1)?
Are the 2025 funding shares for the (40% of allocation proceeds, 10% of fees and penalties) the right starting point (H2)? Is a 50% beneficiary floor right (H6)?
How should be defined, and how should their seats on the ESAF board be filled (H3, H6)?
Which should open each phase (I1), and at what thresholds?
What trackability thresholds should apply in each regime (C11)?
Should operator-level summaries exist at all (B8)?
Every point marked Open for consultation is a real choice. Responses are read, and reasons for accepting or rejecting a change are published (rule G1).